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Abstract
Natural gas is expected to play a much more important role in China in future decades, and market reform is crucial for its
rapid market penetration. At present, the main gas fields, pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure are
mainly monopolized by large state-owned companies, and one of the important market reform policies is to open up LNG
import rights to smaller private companies and traders. Therefore, in the present study, a game theoretical model is
proposed to analyze and compare the impacts of different market structures on infrastructure deployment and social
welfare. Moreover, a support vector machine-based rolling horizon stochastic method is adopted in the model to simulate
real LNG price fluctuations. Four market reform scenarios are proposed considering different policies such as business
separation, third-party access (TPA) and their combinations. The results indicate that, with third-party access (TPA)
entrance into the LNG market, the construction of LNG infrastructure will be promoted and more gas will be provided at
lower prices, and thus the total social welfare will be improved greatly.
Keywords LNG market reform  Market structure  Third-party access  Rolling horizon stochastic method 
Game theory
Abbreviations
DP Domestic gas field producer
LI Original LNG importer
LT Subsequent LNG trader
Indices
t The whole planning period (year, 2015–2022)
r Roll (each roll including 3 years), the decision period
updated every year
s Scenario, including 4 scenarios, namely horizontal
integration, single policy I (business separation), single
policy II (TPA) and combined policies (business
separation & TPA)
r Number of years in each roll ðr ¼ 3Þ
Parameters (SVM), (Game)
RLP Real long-term LNG prices (RMB), obtained year
by year
d Discount rate
b1; b2 Coefficients of demand
PC Unit production cost of domestic gas field, RMB
GC Unit regasification cost of LNG terminal, RMB
LP Stochastic long-term LNG prices, RMB
RT Unit cost of renting LNG terminal, RMB
RC Unit cost of LNG terminal construction, RMB
PRs Probability of scenarios
FC First-stage cost
SC Second-stage cost
Q Domestic production capacity (billion cubic meter)
C Infrastructure construction capacity (billion cubic
meter)
R Regasification capacity (billion cubic meter)
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SP Life span of LNG terminal
Variables
q1 Production of domestic gas field (billion cubic
meter per year)
q2 Production of LNG importer LI (billion cubic
meter per year)
q3 Production of LNG importer LT (billion cubic
meter per year)
c LNG terminal construction volume (billion
cubic meter)
a; b; c; k Lagrange multiplier
1 Introduction
The Chinese government plans to double the share of
natural gas in total primary energy consumption, from the
current 5% to 10% by 2020. Considering the limited
domestic reserves and production, this implies that the
country will have to rely more on imported liquefied nat-
ural gas (LNG) and pipeline gas imports. One of the most
serious problems hindering natural gas’s market penetra-
tion now in China is the inefficiency caused by monopoly,
which suggests an urgent need to conduct market reform.
However, at present the Chinese gas industry is charac-
terized by an oligopolistic structure dominated by three
large state-owned companies (China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation
(SINOPEC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC)). These are not only natural gas producers and
LNG importers, but also the owners and operators of
pipelines and storage facilities. This integrated operation
mode leads to very limited competition existing in the
industry chain, and entry barriers are set accordingly with a
high capital and technology requirement. Therefore, one of
the most promising market liberalization methods is to
permit third-party access (TPA) to LNG import facilities.
When LNG import rights and facilities are open to third
parties and more LNG is imported by private companies
using a spot price, the domestic price is expected to
become more closely linked with international markets. In
particular, it is expected that it will facilitate a downward
pressure on prices. Therefore, social welfare is expected to
be increased, especially when the spot LNG price is much
lower than the domestic production and long-term contract
prices.
Many studies have shown that marketization of the
whole natural gas industry chain would generate higher
production and social welfare. Market competition could
eliminate the cost caused by imperfect information (Devine
et al. 2016; Paltsev and Zhang 2015). Tsygankova (2012)
studied the introduction of market competition in the
Russian natural gas market and found that although market
competition would reduce the profit of monopolists, the
total welfare of the whole industry is improved. On the
other hand, there are also some studies to demonstrate that
competition in the natural gas market cannot always work
efficiently due to different market conditions. Gordon et al.
(2003) concluded that market competition can neither
enlarge the economy of scale, nor improve social welfare.
Meanwhile, the change in market structure could lead to
violent fluctuations on both demand and supply sides
(Arano and Blair 2008; Gordon et al. 2003). China’s nat-
ural gas market is still under monopoly with entrance
barriers. Due to the tremendous market differences
between China’s market and foreign countries, the existing
market models cannot be applied to China directly.
Therefore, it is significant to study the potential market
reforms for China’s natural gas industry by using an
independently developed model.
The previous models applied to natural gas market
analysis are mainly based on game theory. De Wolf and
Smeers (1997) used a Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot model to
describe the equilibrium of the European natural gas mar-
ket. Berton and Zaccour (2006) established and compared
Cournot and Stackelberg game models of an asymmetric
duopoly. Feijoo et al. (2016) developed the North America
Natural Gas Model (NANGAM) to ascertain the impacts of
energy reforms and cross-border trade. Egging et al. (2010)
established a world gas model (WGM) to forecast the price
and trading volume of LNG under different policy condi-
tions, and Gabriel et al. (2012) analyzed the possibility and
effects of cartelization in gas markets by using the model.
GASMOD (Egging et al. 2008) and GASTALE (Lise et al.
2008) also address market power aspects explicitly via the
complementarity format, but their coverage is only over
Europe. However, these existing game theoretical models
have not adequately reflected reality because uncertainty
factors were not considered. Therefore, some studies have
introduced stochastic factors into their natural gas models.
Market participants make decisions by considering the
contingency of natural gas demand (U-tapao et al. 2016;
Zeng and Li 2016; Zhuang and Gabriel 2008). Panapakidis
and Dagoumas (2017) forecast demand for natural gas
based on a combination method of wavelet transform and
an adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS). Beh-
rooz et al. (2017) used an unscented transform to charac-
terize the demand uncertainty in dynamic planning models
of natural gas network. Apart from demand, other factors
such as LNG prices also exhibit high volatilities and ran-
domness (Gong et al. 2016; van Goor and Scholtens 2014;
Trotter et al. 2016). All of these previous studies were
conducted based on the assumption of perfect predictions
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for the stochastic factors’ probability distributions. How-
ever, a more realistic way is to estimate the stochastic
factors based on relevant practical information rather than
assumptions of probability distributions. As for factor
estimation, it is always much more difficult to get complete
information of the whole decision horizon rather than only
two or three steps ahead. Therefore, some academics
introduced the rolling horizon method into the stochastic
process of the natural gas game model (Devine et al. 2016;
Guigues et al. 2014). In the traditional approach, the
decision for the whole time horizon is made in the first
period with the assumption of perfect information for the
LNG price probability distribution. However, in the pro-
posed rolling horizon approach, the price information is
practically imperfect with information available only two
to three periods ahead. Moreover, the rolling horizon
approach allows a two-level endogenous learning process
and roll-by-roll update mechanism for game theory deci-
sions. Devine et al. (2016) demonstrated that the rolling
horizon stochastic approach can tackle the uncertainties
more flexibly and accurately compared with traditional
approaches.
In the present study, a game analysis model was devel-
oped to calculate the benefit of the LNG import market
reform in China. Compared with existing studies on market
structure (Lorenczik and Panke 2016), multi-stage
stochastic factors such as LNG import price in the natural
gas upstream market are considered, and an integrated
stochastic approach is adopted to conduct dynamic planning
with an endogenous probability distribution. Therefore, in
the model, (1) the SVM method is used to forecast the LNG
price as a stochastic factor to handle its uncertainties; (2) the
rolling horizon method provides a dynamic planning
framework based on the probability distribution obtained
from the SVM forecast result, and roll-by-roll information
update and endogenous learning; (3) a game theoretical
method is applied to generate the final equilibrium decision
of planning, maximizing individual profit of each market
participant under the rolling horizon framework, and thus
the decisions are also updated and adjusted roll by roll.
The game relationships among the state oil companies
(SOCs) and private companies are focused and analyzed. Two-
level market equilibria are generated. The first level is in the
LNG receiving capacity, in which the private company rents
the surplus capacity from the capacity owners at a market-
clearing price. The rent price and equilibrium rent capacity are
codecided by both players with each pursuing their individual
maximum profit. The second level is the equilibrium of all the
natural gas suppliers and consumers. Here, the on-land natural
gas producer is also in charge of pipeline imports and faced
with a composite cost including extraction cost, transportation
cost and long-term pipeline gas import cost. At the demand
side, the market power of consumers is expressed by the
demand function. The supply–demand balance is achieved by
game equilibria amongmarket participants with each pursuing
their individual maximum profit.
The paper is structured as follows: An overview of the
model framework and details of each method are intro-
duced in Sect 2; an analysis of Chinese natural gas market
reforms is performed in Sect. 3, followed by conclusions
and discussion in Sect. 4.
2 Methodology
2.1 Methodology framework
The framework for the SVM-based rolling horizon
stochastic game model proposed here is shown in Fig. 1.
In China, natural gas supply includes three parts:
domestic gas field production, pipeline gas imports and
LNG imports. The domestic gas price is still under gov-
ernment regulation, and almost all the contracts of pipe-
line gas imports are of long-term, with the most
significant volatility arising from LNG import prices. As a
consequence, in each roll, a SVM regression model is
used to forecast the future LNG price based on historical
information. The result is taken as the main branch of
each scenario tree. As shown in Fig. 2, the forecast result
is the LNG price of red nodes (basic nodes) and the
corresponding accuracy of the SVM model in the test
process is applied as their probability. The probability
distribution of other nodes in the scenario tree is obtained
based on the basic nodes. After the SVM model in each
roll is completed, the decisions of each market participant
based on the whole information of the roll can be
obtained by the game theoretical model. In the game
theoretical model, game players including the SOCs (DP
and LI) and private companies (LT) make decisions on
their gas supply volume to pursue their maximized indi-
vidual net profit for each roll, as shown in Fig. 1. The
decisions of each market participant based on the whole
information of the current roll can be obtained; however,
only the plan for first year in each roll (when r = t) will
be implemented practically. Although the decisions made
in other years of each roll (when r = t) will not be
implemented, they also have impacts on the decision of
the first year in each roll (when r = t) endogenously. At
the beginning of each year, the previous year’s price
information becomes known, and the historical data will
be updated and used to train the SVM model in the
current year. In this way, a new scenario tree is formed,
and a new market equilibrium is obtained from the game
model. The integrated model operates roll by roll, with
the information updated simultaneously.
900 Petroleum Science (2018) 15:898–911
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As shown in Fig. 2, perfect information of the future
probability distribution is necessary for stochastic factors
using the traditional binary tree approach, but this is difficult
to achieve in practice. Moreover, the future probability
distribution is set in advance and cannot be adjusted flexibly
even if large fluctuations happen during the planning period.
Furthermore, it is difficult to compute efficiently for too
many scenarios when the planning period increases to a
relatively long time. Finally, some unrealistic scenarios
cannot be eliminated efficiently, for example, the green
nodes may be unrealistic; however, they will be involved in
further computations regardless. In the proposed approach, a
machine learning process SVM is used to modify the
probability distribution of the LNG price movement in the
rolling horizon method. The forecasting result of the SVM
method is used to form the main branch of the scenario tree
in the rolling horizon approach, and the precision of fore-
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Fig. 2 Comparison of the rolling horizon approach and the traditional
approach
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the probability of the corresponding main branch. Every
time when the price information in the rolling horizon
method is updated, the new data will be used for training the
SVM. Therefore, the price information updated in the rolling
horizon method offers new data for SVM learning. As a
result, the forecast precision of SVM can be improved and
the uncertainties of future conditions can be reduced. Fur-
thermore, the SVM-based rolling horizon method can allow
information update and decision adjustment, as well as an
endogenous learning process. Therefore, compared with
traditional approaches, the proposed approach can show
much better performance when faced with future
uncertainties.
2.2 SVM forecast approach
In order to provide a more convincing and robust result, the
SVM method is used to simulate the future LNG price
fluctuations. SVM is a supervised machine learning method
based on structural risk minimization, which requires a
relatively small amount of learning data compared with
other machine learning methods. The training process of
the SVM method is equivalent to solving a quadratic
optimization problem. This property ensures that it will
generate a unique and globally optimal solution (Pa-
padimitriou et al. 2014). Consider a data set xt; ytð Þf g in
which xt is the input vector at time t and yt is the corre-
sponding output vector which is defined as:
yt ¼ f ðxtÞ ¼ w  gðxtÞ þ b; ð1Þ
where gðÞ denotes for the function that maps input data xt
into a high-dimensional feature space. The weight wk k and










s:t: yt  w  g xtð Þ  b eþ nt ð3Þ
w  g xtð Þ þ b yt  eþ nþt ð4Þ
nt ; n
þ
t  0; ð5Þ
where ||w|| is also called the regularized term, C is denoted






is the empirical error. When
f xtð Þ departs from yt, SVM would penalize it by means of
an e-insensitive loss function with 2e bandwidth:
yt  f xtð Þj je¼
0; if yt  f xtð Þj j  e




Therefore, as the solution to the aforementioned mini-
mization problem, the final SVM for the nonlinear function
is of the form:





K x; xtð Þ þ b; ð7Þ
where ht and ht are the Lagrange multipliers and K x; xtð Þ ¼
g xð Þ  g xtð Þ represents a kernel, which is the inner product
of vectors x and xt in the space g xð Þ and g xtð Þ. A Gaussian
basis kernel is often used and is the most powerful one in
nonlinear function regression (Yan and Chowdhury 2014).





2.3 Rolling horizon stochastic method
In the process of dynamic planning for a certain period, it is
difficult to obtain complete relevant information. More-
over, since the reliability of information decreases with
time to the forecast date, it is difficult to make credible
forecasts relatively far into the future (Cˇeperic´ et al. 2017;
Odetayo et al. 2017). Considering the imperfect informa-
tion issue, a rolling horizon method is used to describe the
real decision process.
The decision procedure of an SVM-based rolling hori-
zon method is depicted in Fig. 3. In each roll r, the price
information of the first period (namely, t = r) is known
exactly, while the information of the other two periods
(namely, t = r ? 1 and t = r ? 2) is unknown. In the next
roll r* (r* = r ? 1), the second period in roll r (t = r?1)
becomes the first period in roll r* (t = r*). That is, the
unknown information of the second period in roll r now
becomes known in roll r*.
Through the SVM regression method, in each roll, the
main branch of the scenario tree is obtained as the red trail
shown in Fig. 3. The LP1;2;1 and LP2;3;1 are the predicted
results in roll 1. The pr1;2;1 (marked as p) indicates the
probability of the forecast result LP1;2;1 occurring. There-
fore, the accuracy calculated in the test process of the SVM
model is simulated as its probability. In the testing process
of the SVM approach, if the forecast result is within 95%–
105% of the real data of the same period, it is considered as
‘‘correct.’’ The accuracy is calculated as the number of
‘‘correct’’ forecasting data divided by the total amount of
testing data. So the proportion of ‘‘correct’’ forecasts in
testing (accuracy) is extended to describe the likelihood of
forecasting correctly (probability). Since the forecast price
LP1;2;1 increased by 1.94% compared with LP1;1;1, the
LP1;2;2 is computed symmetrically: decreasing the same
percent of LP1;1;1, with a probability of q (equal to 1 - p).
902 Petroleum Science (2018) 15:898–911
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Thus, pr2;3;1 is the square of pr1;2;1 and pr1;3;1 ¼ p  q.
Similarly, scenario trees are built with each roll.
2.4 Dynamic game model of China’s natural gas
market
2.4.1 Scenario design
In this section, four scenarios are set in order to determine
the different impacts of the main reforms in the natural gas
upstream market and their combined effects.
The first reform is business separation. According to the
Smith–Young theorem (Stigler 1951), the expansion of
market scale will boost the precise division on the supply
side. In practice, there is a corresponding trend of precise
division in the Chinese natural gas upstream market: The
LNG import volume of CNOOC occupied 67% and 73.6%
of the total LNG imports in 2013 and 2014, respectively,
while its domestic production only occupied around 10%
of the gross production in China. Therefore, there is a
possibility that CNOOC will focus more on LNG imports.
The second reform is regarding TPA and was implemented
at the end of 2014 by the Chinese National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC). In China, the utilization
ratio of LNG terminals was only about 51.3% and 52.3% in
2014 and 2015, respectively, mainly caused by the weak
demand. Because of the monopoly issue and cross-subsi-
dies, the gas price has remained at an excessively high
level. TPA is an efficient way to increase competition in
the upstream natural gas market. Suppliers will decrease
their prices in order to gain market share. Moreover, most
LNG import contracts of Chinese state-owned companies
are long-term contracts in order to ensure LNG supply.
However, the private companies do not have the respon-
sibility to ensure supply security, so their actions are more
flexible. Especially from 2015, the LNG spot price has
remained at low levels, and private companies can buy
LNG at spot prices rather than long-term contracts. On the
other hand, in order to maintain market share, SOCs have
to follow the downward trend of gas prices. Therefore, the
market equilibrium price of natural gas will drop, which
will further stimulate its demand. In this way, TPA can
improve the efficiency of the utilization of LNG terminals.
In order to identify the different impacts of the reforms
and their combined effect, four scenarios are proposed
according to different market structures, as shown in
Fig. 4.
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Fig. 3 SVM-based rolling horizon stochastic method
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In the first market structure scenario, the whole gas
market was monopolized by a horizontally integrated
company. The company extracts natural gas from domestic
gas fields as well as importing LNG. For example, before
the market reform, the three big state-owned companies
CNPC, SINOPEC and CNOOC, monopolized both
domestic gas fields and LNG terminals. Since there is no
competitor in the perfect monopoly market, Scenario 1 is
an optimization problem.
Scenario 2 Single policy I (business separation)
In the second scenario, business separation is conducted
in the upstream sector: Oligopoly companies DP and LI are
in charge of domestic production and LNG imports,
respectively. Thus, market equilibrium will be determined
by a simultaneous game of two heterogeneous producers
DP and LI. For instance, if the business of each state-
owned company is specialized, CNPC and SINOPEC will
only be in charge of domestic natural gas extraction, while
CNOOC is only in charge of the LNG import business.
Scenario 3 Single policy II (third-party access, TPA)
In Scenario 3, TPA is permitted to import LNG by
renting facilities. The market equilibrium is codetermined
by the TPA together with the original monopolists DP and
LI. A natural gas market totally monopolized by state-
owned companies will lead to low efficiency or pricing
disturbances across the whole industry chain, and TPA is a
relatively straightforward and efficient way to introduce a
competition mechanism into a monopoly market. Apart
from the big three state-owned companies, private com-
panies will be permitted to import LNG from the global
market directly.
Scenario 4 Combined policies (business separation and
TPA)
In Scenario 4, both business separation and TPA are
implemented. In this scenario, after the implementation of
business separation, CNPC and SINOPEC become pure
domestic producers, while CNOOC is the LNG importer.
Then LNG market TPA is permitted and private companies
can rent the LNG terminals of the original LNG importer.
Compared with the simple TPA scenario (Scenario 3),
Scenario 4 can be used to obtain the best market conditions
of introducing TPA to improve the market competition
level.
2.4.2 Dynamic game model of China’s natural gas market
On the end-user side, market price is formed through the
production competition of game players since the total
demand is met by the suppliers jointly. The demand
function of the whole market is:
p ¼ b1 þ b2 q1 þ q2 þ q3ð Þ; ð9Þ
where p is the natural gas price, and q1, q2 and q3 are the
supply of DP, LI and LT, respectively.
At the supply side, different models are set in each
scenario:
Scenario 1 Horizontal integration
In this scenario, an integrated company owns the
domestic gas fields and LNG terminals simultaneously.
The objective of the integrated company (the domestic
producer and LNG importer, DP ? LI) is to maximize its
total profit. The total profit is expressed as the revenue
from selling natural gas to consumers subtracting the costs
from domestic production, pipeline gas imports, LNG
imports and regasification, infrastructure construction as
well as natural gas transportation, as shown in Eq. (10). In
particular, the cost of pipeline gas imports and average
transportation cost are included in PCt. Based on the
aforementioned assumptions, the integrated company
makes decisions on the extraction volume of gas fields q1,
LNG import volume q2 and the expanded regasification
capacity c, subject to technical and economic constraints.
The domestic production and infrastructure construction
cannot exceed their upper bounds as shown in Eqs. (11)
and (13), respectively. On the other hand, the upper limit of
LNG import volume is the sum of the existing and new-
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Fig. 4 Structure of natural gas upstream market model
904 Petroleum Science (2018) 15:898–911
123
q2str  Gt þ
Xt1
m¼1
cmsr bstrð Þ ð12Þ
cstr  Ct astrð Þ: ð13Þ
Scenario 2 Business separation
In the second scenario, gas fields and LNG terminals
belong to the domestic producer DP and LNG importer LI,
respectively. In Scenario 1, DP and LI are integrated into a
monopoly company; therefore, they have a mutual objec-
tive, Eq. (10). On the other hand, in Scenario 2, DP and LI
become independent and they are aiming at maximizing
their own objectives, respectively, Eq. (14) and (16). The
market power is thus changed. DP decides the extraction
volume q1 to maximize its profit, which is expressed as the
revenue from selling natural gas to consumers subtracting
the cost of production, as shown in Eq. (14). Meanwhile,
the production volume cannot exceed the capacity as












= 1þ dð Þt1
ð14Þ
s:t q1str  Qt kstrð Þ: ð15Þ
On the other hand, LNG importer LI decides the import
volume q2 of LNG and the expanded regasification
capacity c of each year to maximize its profit. LI’s profit is
the revenue from selling natural gas to consumers, sub-
tracting the cost of domestic production, LNG import and
gasification, and infrastructure construction, as shown in
Eq. (16). The upper limit of LNG import volume is the sum
of the existing and new-built receiving capacity as shown
in Eq. (17). Infrastructure construction cannot surpass its















= 1þ dð Þt1
ð16Þ
s:t q2str  Gt þ
Xt1
m¼1
cmsr bstrð Þ ð17Þ
cstr  Ct astrð Þ: ð18Þ
Scenario 3 Third-party access (TPA)
In Scenario 3, there is an integrated company (the
domestic producer and LNG importer, DP ? LI) as
described in Scenario 1 and a new market entrant LT. The
integrated company pursues the maximum profit, which
equals the revenue from selling natural gas to consumers
and leasing surplus regasification capacity to LT, sub-
tracting the cost of domestic production, LNG import and
gasification, and infrastructure construction, as shown in
Eq. (19). In this scenario, the integrated company decides
the domestic production, LNG imports and LNG terminal
construction, as well as the regasification capacity leasing
to LT. However, the LT is subject to some constraints: the
domestic production capacity bounds (20) and the infras-
tructure construction capacity constraint (22). Moreover,
the sum of LNG import volumes from LT and LI cannot
exceed the total amount of the existing and new-built


















PCtqistr  GCt þ LPstrð Þq2str  T  t þ 1
SP
RCtcstr
þ rtstr  GCtð Þqr3str= 1þ dð Þt1
ð19Þ
s:t q1str  Qt kstrð Þ ð20Þ
q2str þ qr3str  Gt þ
Xt1
m¼1
cmsr bstrð Þ ð21Þ
cstr  Ct astrð Þ: ð22Þ
The new market entrant LT also pursues its own maxi-
mum profit by deciding the LNG terminal capacity rented
from the integrated company and the import volume. LT’s
profit is the revenue from selling natural gas to consumers
subtracting the cost of the rental fee and import cost as
shown in Eq. (23). Meanwhile, the LT cannot import











 rtstr þ LPstrð Þq3str= 1þ dð Þt1
ð23Þ
s:t q2str þ q3str  Gt þ
Xt1
m¼1
cmsr cstrð Þ: ð24Þ
The rent for regasification capacity of LI is codeter-
mined by the owner and the renter through the market-
clearing condition, as shown in Eq. (25).
q2str ¼ q3str rtstrð Þ: ð25Þ
Scenario 4 Business separation & LNG market TPA
In Scenario 4, both business separation and TPA are
introduced. There are three companies competing in the
Petroleum Science (2018) 15:898–911 905
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market, including the domestic producer (DP), LNG
importer (LI) and new market entrant (LNG trader, LT).
The domestic producer DP decides the extraction vol-
ume of natural gas to maximize its profit which is the
revenue from selling natural gas to consumers subtracting
the cost of production, as shown in Eq. (26). Meanwhile,












= 1þ dð Þt1
ð26Þ
s:t q1str  Qt kstrð Þ: ð27Þ
The original LNG importer LI makes decisions on both
the import volume of LNG and the expanded regasification
capacity each year. LI’s profit is the revenue from selling
natural gas to consumers and leasing surplus regasification
capacity to LT, subtracting the cost from domestic pro-
duction, LNG imports and gasification, and infrastructure
construction, as shown in Eq. (28). The sum of LNG
import volume from LT and LI cannot exceed the total
amount of the existing and new-built receiving capacity as
Eq. (29). There is also an upper bound for infrastructure











 GCt þ LPstrð Þq2str  T  t þ 1
SP
RCtcstr
þ rtstr  GCtð Þqr3str= 1þ dð Þt1
ð28Þ
s:t q2str þ qr3str  Gt þ
Xt1
m¼1
cmsr bstrð Þ ð29Þ
cstr  Ct astrð Þ: ð30Þ
Similar to Scenario 3, the new market entrant LT rents
LNG terminals from the original LNG importer LI. Its
profit is the revenue from selling natural gas to consumers
subtracting the cost of the rental fee and import cost as
shown in Eq. (31). Meanwhile, the LT cannot import more











 rtstr þ LPstrð Þq3str= 1þ dð Þt1
ð31Þ
s:t q2str þ q3str  Gt þ
Xt1
m¼1
cmsr cstrð Þ: ð32Þ
As for the rent for regasification capacity of LNG
importer LI, it is also generated by the game between the
owner LI and the renter LT through a market-clearing
condition, as shown in Eq. (33).
q2str ¼ q3str rtstrð Þ: ð33Þ
2.5 Tools
The SVM regression model is accomplished in R using the
e1071 package. R is an integrated suite of software facil-
ities for data manipulation, calculation and graphical dis-
play (Venables et al. 2016). The e1071 package is designed
for machine learning and data mining.
The non-cooperative game theoretical complementarity
model is developed in the general algebraic modeling
system (GAMS) as a mixed complementarity problem
(MCP) (Rosenthal 2004). Gabriel et al. (2001), Hobbs
(2001) and Tung et al. (2013) have proved the mathemat-
ical properties of existence and uniqueness for the MCP
solution. In this paper, the MCP problem is solved using
the PATH solver. It takes 214 s in total to solve this
problem on a computer with i7 2.5 GHZ CPU and 4 GB
memory. GAMS is a platform that uses algebraic language
and efficient solvers for analyzing complex, large-scale
linear, nonlinear, integer and complementarity problems
(Rosenthal 2004). The PATH solver is a Newton-based
algorithm for solving complementarity problems.
3 Result
3.1 Data
In this section, the numerical simulation using the SVM-
based rolling horizon game model is described based on the
data of China’s natural gas market (shown in Table 1) and
the demand function is proposed based on assumption.
A 1-year deposit rate with a prospective premium is
used as the discount rate d, stipulated as 3.5%, and the
production costs of heterogeneous suppliers are also dif-
ferent. Domestic producer DP is faced with a composite
unit production cost PC, which consists of the extraction
cost, transportation cost and long-term pipeline gas import
cost. Apart from the feed stock cost (mainly long-term
LNG), the production costs GC that the original LNG
importer LI is faced with are the unit regasification cost and
unit infrastructure construction cost, while the production
cost for LT is the LNG terminal rent. The feed stock for LI
and LT is LNG, and the price is obtained by the SVM
regression method using the data of CIF price of LNG with
a transportation adjustment.
In SVM forecasting, since no Chinese monthly LNG
import price can be directly found, the monthly data of
Japan’s average LNG import price (from IEA database) are
906 Petroleum Science (2018) 15:898–911
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used for regression. Japan is the biggest LNG importer in
the world and geographically close to China; therefore,
most Chinese LNG contracts take Japanese prices as a
reference or benchmark. The time span of the data is from
1996 to 2015. Thus, the total sample size is 240, among
which, according to the rule of thumb, 70% of the total data
is used for training, 15% for testing, and 15% for fore-
casting. In the rolling horizon approach, the updated price
data are calculated based on the forecasts of Exxon Mobil
(2016).
3.2 Result
This section presents the results obtained from the SVM-
based rolling horizon stochastic game model. The results
are reported from three aspects: (1) facility capacity; (2)
trading volume; and (3) benefit of LNG market reform.
3.2.1 Facility capacity
As shown in Fig. 5, with the increase in market competi-
tion, the cumulative regasification capacity of LNG ter-
minals increases as well. In Scenarios 2, 3 and 4, the
regasification capacity increased by 88.4, 203.6 and
211.4%, respectively, compared with the monopoly sce-
nario. If only one reform is implemented, TPA can work
better than business separation in terms of the impact on
LNG terminal construction. However, if both of the reform
policies are implemented simultaneously, the cumulative
regasification capacity only rises by 3.83% compared to the
single policy II (TPA), indicating an overlapping effect of
the two policies.
3.2.2 Trading volume
The trading volume of each game player is shown in Fig. 6.
Since the cost of domestic production is much lower than
LNG import and regasification, domestic producer DP
would extract natural gas at full capacity in each scenario.
After business separation, the trading volume of LI is
almost doubled compared with the complete monopoly
scenario.
When TPA is introduced in the LNG import market, the
allocations of LNG trading volume between LI and LT are
much different to the last two scenarios. In Scenario 3, the
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Fig. 6 Dynamic planning of natural gas trading volume in the three
scenarios
Table 1 Data
Parameter Value in period t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
d (discount rate) 3.5%
PC (unit production cost of gas field, RMB/m3) 1.8
GC (unit regasification cost, RMB/m3) 0.3
RC (unit cost of terminal construction, RMB/m3) 1.2
R (initial regasification capacity, bcm) 50
SP (life span of LNG terminals, year) 20
b2 (slope of demand function) -0.05
b1 (intercept of demand function) 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
Q (domestic production capacity, bcm) 184 195 216 220 237 238 240 259
C (infrastructure construction capacity, bcm) 50 50 50 80 80 80 80 80
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are below 40 bcm, while the LNG import volume of LT is
about 4 times more than the integrated company. On the
other hand, in Scenario 4, the LNG import volume of LI is
far more than the LT’s trading volume. Since the payment
for LT renting LI’s LNG terminals is decided by market-
clearing conditions, the player with stronger market power
would benefit more in the negotiation of the rent. In Sce-
nario 3, LI is only a sector of the integrated company,
which means the integrated company can obtain its market
share from domestic production. Therefore, the integrated
company will use the LNG terminal less and lease the
capacity to LT to obtain more profits. The results show that
the integrated company gets a payment of 449.2 billion
RMB from surplus regasification capacity leasing using its
market power. In Scenario 4, LI is an independent com-
pany which has less power than the integrated company in
Scenario 3. To keep its market share, LI will not lease out
all of its regasification capacity; as a result, LI can only get
a total rent of 123.6 billion RMB from LT.
3.2.3 Benefit of LNG market reform
To quantitatively determine the effect of market reforms,
the social welfare is defined as the sum of producers’ profit





P Qð ÞdQ PQ; ð34Þ
where Q is the total trading volume and P is the market
price natural gas. * denotes the market equilibrium
conditions.
The result of market equilibrium and total producers’
profit are shown in Fig. 7; in different market reform sce-
narios with more and more competition, the price is
decreasing and the total trading volume and social welfare
are increasing.
Compared with Scenario 1, the prices of Scenario 2,
Scenario 3 and Scenario 4 decreased by 8.56, 9.41 and
10.7%, respectively; however, their total trading volume
increased by 26.3, 28.9 and 33.0%, respectively. In Sce-
nario 1, since the whole market is monopolized by an
integrated company, the monopolist would maintain pro-
duction at a relatively low level and charge consumers a
relatively high price to obtain an excessive profit. As the
number of market participants increases, the market power
of each company is undermined. If one of the game players
takes the former complete monopoly price, the other
players would offer a lower price to dominate the market.
Therefore, the total production will increase and the equi-
librium price will drop through the production competition.
As shown in the pie charts in Fig. 8, the total amount
and constitution of social welfare have also changed.
Compared with Scenario 1, consumers’ surplus in Scenario
2, Scenario 3 and Scenario 4 increased by 61.2, 68.6 and
79.0%, respectively, which is mirrored by the decrease in
producers’ profit. At the same time, the total social welfare
raised by 10.2, 10.9 and 12.0%, respectively. As the market
competition increases, the consumers will get more bene-
fits, while the profit of producers is undermined, and thus
the total social welfare is improved. Therefore, a single
policy (in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3) is Pareto improving
compared with the complete monopoly scenario (Scenario
1), and the combined policies (Scenario 4) is Pareto
improving compared with a single policy scenario. From
the aspect of total social welfare, combined policies will
make a better market equilibrium.
In Scenario 3, if the TPA is implemented separately, the
original LNG importer LI will suffer great losses. The
profit of LI in Scenario 3 only equals 20.2% of Scenario 4.
However, in Scenario 4, the profit and production of the
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Fig. 8 Social welfare makeup in four scenarios
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profit of domestic producer DP also dropped by 2.25%, and
the total profit of producers decreased by 1.85%.
4 Conclusions and discussion
To promote the consumption of natural gas in China,
market reforms will play a crucial role. The comparison of
the impacts of two single policy scenarios (business sepa-
ration and TPA) and their cross-effects are made using an
SVM-based rolling horizon stochastic game model in the
present study.
(1) From the aspects of infrastructure capacity, with the
increase in market competition, the cumulative
regasification capacity of LNG terminals increases
as well. When a single reform policy is imple-
mented, business separation and TPA, the regasifi-
cation capacity will increase by 88.4% and 203.6%
compared with the complete monopoly scenario.
Furthermore, when the two reform policies are
implemented simultaneously, the capacity only
increases by 3.83% compared with the TPA sce-
nario. This may be caused by the overlap effect of
two policies on LNG infrastructure construction.
(2) As the marketization level increases, the trading
volume of DP is maintained; on the other hand, the
trading volumes of LI and LT increased tremen-
dously. The stability of DP’s trading volume comes
from its relatively low production cost. After busi-
ness separation, the trading volume of LI is more
than doubled compared with the complete monopoly
scenario due to the change in market power.
(3) When the TPA is permitted in Scenario 3 and
Scenario 4, LI will lend surplus LNG receiving
capacity to entrant LT. In China, private companies
usually have exclusive local distribution channels for
natural gas, while SOCs have to transport and
distribute natural gas nationwide. Private companies
can make more profit than SOCs by saving distri-
bution cost in LNG trading. The comprehensive
production cost (including distribution cost) of SOC
(LI) is 0.3 RMB/m3, while the cost of private
company LT is around 0.2 RMB/m3. Although SOCs
own LNG terminals, private companies have the
comparative advantage in LNG trading. Therefore,
the SOCs have the incentive to obtain extra profit by
lending capacity to private companies and collect the
rent fee rather than utilizing the capacity by them-
selves, and the private companies are also willing to
allot parts of their profit as renting fee to rent the
SOCs’ LNG terminal capacity. A win–win situation
is reached, and the utilization ratio of LNG terminals
is thus improved.
(4) Moreover, although the TPA is permitted in both
Scenario 3 and Scenario 4, the allocations of LNG
trading volume between LI and LT are significantly
different. With TPA, the LNG imports of the inte-
grated company are below 50 bcm, while the LNG
import volume of LT is about four timesmore than the
integrated company. When the two policies are both
implemented simultaneously, theLNG import volume
of LI is more than twice the LT’s trading volume. This
dramatic difference is caused by the different market
power of the leasers in the two scenarios. The total rent
obtained by the leaser in Scenario 3 is 263.4% more
compared to Scenario 4.
(5) As the market competition increases, the equilibrium
price and producers’ total profit decreased, while the
total trading volume, consumers’ surplus and social
welfare increased. The total social welfare increased
by 10.2, 10.9 and 12.0% in Scenario 2, Scenario 3
and Scenario 4, respectively, compared with Sce-
nario 1. Therefore, a single policy (in Scenario 2 and
Scenario 3) is Pareto improving compared with the
complete monopoly scenario (Scenario 1), and the
combined policies (Scenario 4) is Pareto improving
compared with a single policy scenario. From the
aspect of total social welfare, combined policies will
make a better market equilibrium, because as the
number of market participants increases, the market
power of each company is undermined and con-
sumers’ market power is enhanced.
(6) Furthermore, the profit of LI in Scenario 3 is only
equal to 20.2% of that in Scenario 4. As is
aforementioned, LT has cost advantages compared
with LI, when TPA is introduced, LT will lower the
market price, and other suppliers have to follow the
downward trend. LI will lend most regasification
capacity to LT to collect the rental income rather
than directly import with a relatively high cost.
However, given the situation that SOCs will suffer
great loss after only the TPA is implemented, it may
bring about a social acceptability issue on market
reform implementation. If business separation and
TPA are both implemented simultaneously in Sce-
nario 4, the profit and production of the new entrant
LT is 79.0% lower than that in Scenario 3. Since DP,
LI, LT become independent companies, LI has to
keep its market share to ensure its market power.
Therefore, LT cannot rent as much capacity as in
Scenario 3. Obviously, the investors would prefer the
single policy of TPA rather than combined policies.
Therefore, from the aspect of diversity of LNG
importer and nurturing new market participants, the
Petroleum Science (2018) 15:898–911 909
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single policy of TPA will play a more effective role
than combined policies.
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Appendix
A. KKT conditions for each scenario in rolling
horizon approach in Sect. 2.4
The MCP for Scenario 1 consists of Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
(KKT) conditions A.1–A.3: A.1 is related to the decision
variable of domestic producer DP, while A.2 and A.3 are
related to the decision variables of LNG importer LI.





= 1þ dð Þt1kstr?q1str  0
ðA:1Þ
0  PRstr b1t þ 2b2t
X
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qistr  GCt  LPstr
 !
= 1þ dð Þt1bstr?q2str  0
ðA:2Þ








þ l1k2 bsxy þ b1 rþ2ð Þr þ b2 rþ2ð Þr
 
þ l2k2 bsxy þ b3 rþ2ð Þr þ b4 rþ2ð Þr
 
þ k3bstr  astr?cstr  0:
ðA:3Þ
The MCP for Scenario 2 consists of KKT condi-
tions A.4–A.6: A.4 is related to the decision variable of
domestic producer DP, while A.5 and A.6 are related to the
decision variables of LNG importer LI.
0  PRstr b1t þ b2t 2q1str þ q2strð Þ  PCt½ 
= 1þ dð Þt1kstr?q1str  0
ðA:4Þ
0  PRstr b1t þ b2t q1str þ 2q2strð Þ  GCt  LPstr½ 
= 1þ dð Þt1bstr?q2str  0
ðA:5Þ








þ l1k2 bsxy þ b1 rþ2ð Þr þ b2 rþ2ð Þr
 
þ l2k2 bsxy þ b3 rþ2ð Þr þ b4 rþ2ð Þr
 
þ k3bstr  astr?cstr  0:
ðA:6Þ
The MCP for Scenario 3 consists of market-clearing
conditions (25) along with KKT conditions A.7–A.11: A.7
is related to the decision variable of domestic producer DP;
A.8, A.10 and A.11 are related to the decision variables of
LNG importer LI; and A.9 is related to the decision vari-
able of LNG trader LT.
0  PRstr b1t þ b2t 2q1str þ 2q2str þ q3strð Þ  PCt½ 
= 1þ dð Þt1kstr?q1str  0
ðA:7Þ
0  PRstr b1t þ b2t 2q1str þ 2q2str þ q3strð Þ  GCt  LPstr½ 
= 1þ dð Þt1bstr? q2str  0
ðA:8Þ
0  PRstr b1t þ b2t q1str þ q2str þ 2q3strð Þ  rtstr  LPstr½ 
= 1þ dð Þt1bstr? q3str  0
ðA:9Þ
0  rtstr  GCtð Þ= 1þ dð Þt1bstr?qr3str  0 ðA:10Þ








þ l1k2 bsxy þ b1 rþ2ð Þr þ b2 rþ2ð Þr
 
þ l2k2 bsxy þ b3 rþ2ð Þr þ b4 rþ2ð Þr
 
þ k3bstr  astr?cstr  0:
ðA:11Þ
The MCP for Scenario 4 consists of market-clearing
conditions (33) along with KKT conditions A.12–A.16:
A.12 is related to the decision variable of domestic pro-
ducer DP; A.13, A.15 and A.16 are related to the decision
variables of LNG importer LI; and A.14 is related to the
decision variable of LNG trader LT.
0  PRstr b1t þ b2t 2q1str þ q2str þ q3strð Þ  PCt½ 
= 1þ dð Þt1kstr?q1str  0
ðA:12Þ
0  PRstr b1t þ b2t q1str þ 2q2str þ q3strð Þ  GCt  LPstr½ 
= 1þ dð Þt1bstr? q2str  0
ðA:13Þ
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0  PRstr b1t þ b2t q1str þ q2str þ 2q3strð Þ½
rtstr  LPstr= 1þ dð Þt1bstr?q3str  0
ðA:14Þ
0  rtstr  GCtð Þ= 1þ dð Þt1bstr?qr3str  0 ðA:15Þ








þ l1k2 bsxy þ b1 rþ2ð Þr þ b2 rþ2ð Þr
 
þ l2k2 bsxy þ b3 rþ2ð Þr þ b4 rþ2ð Þr
 
þ k3bstr  astr?cstr  0:
ðA:16Þ
Since the second derivatives of objectives are nonneg-
ative, the individual optimization problems are convex.
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